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Something rotten in the state of Czechia? 
 
The Czech Republic has been in the news recently because of its politicians’ somewhat quixotic 
campaign to rebrand the country to the world as ‘Czechia’ (The Guardian 2016). But among 
political scientists and businesspeople the country’s name has long suffered worst damage than 
this. 
Widely seen in the first decade after 1989 as a leading democratiser with high standards of 
governance overseen by a well-established set of West European-style political parties, the 
country has since acquired a reputation for engrained political graft and high level corruption, 
which has blemished its record of reform and modernisation. 
In successive elections in 2010 and 2013, the established Czech party system collapsed like a 
house of cards as – as elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe (Hanley, Sikk 2013) – voters 
turned to a diverse array of protest parties promising to address the country’s ills by killing off 
political dinosaurs, fighting corruption and promoting direct democracy. Political scientists 
quickly spotted this electoral turbulence and the unusual new parties it gave rise to, but few 
stopped to wonder why and how earlier judgements of the Czech party system as an ersatz, but 
basically functional, equivalent of West European party politics had been off the mark. 
Michal Klíma’s new book Od totality k defektní demokracii: Privatizace a kolonizace 
politických stran netransparentním byznysem [From totalitarianism to defective democracy: the 
privatisation and colonisation of parties by non-transparent business] tackles this issue head-
on, suggesting that rather than being a normal party system distorted by elements of corruption, 
the Czech Republic’s post-1989 party-political settlement was a deeply corrupt system overlain 
with a facade of left – right competition. His book sets out to chronicle and explore how and 
why this evolved, drawing on a rich seam of Czech investigative journalism and focusing on 
the two principal pillars of post-1989 party system: the centre-right Civic Democratic Party 
(ODS) and the Czech Social Democrats (ČSSD). 
 
 
Regional ‘godfathers’ 
 
By far the book’s most impressive achievement is its careful reconstruction of the subversion 
and takeover of parties and party organisations at the regional level by ‘godfathers’ (kmotři). 
Far from providing an impetus for political and economic development, EU-mandated 
regionalisation and the coming on stream of structural funds, managed by regional agencies and 
spent by regional authorities, triggered the takeover of party organisations by corrupt vested 
interests. Their usual modus operandi was the recruitment of fake or paid for party members (in 
Czech political parlance so-called ‘dead souls’) which allowed the capture of first local and 
then regional party organisations and often opened up the way to national influence. 
  
But the ‘provincial godfathers’ who brokered or bankrolled corrupt deals – typically owners of 
regional building, transport or security firms – were small fry compared to bigger national 
players who had made fortunes in the privatisations of the 1990s and their aftermath and 
exploited the opportunities offered by state-owned companies such as the electricity giant ČEZ. 
These bigger economic and political operators exercised influence on parties and politicians 
more directly at national level through the corrupt ‘lobbying’ (lobbování) – the Czech word 
carries powerful overtones of sleaze – of politicians. This completed the second arm of a pincer 
movement on parties, hollowing them out and taking over from above as well as from below. 
The upshot Klíma concludes is that the Czech Republic’s much vaunted ‘standard’ model of 
party politics was – or quickly degenerated into – a Potemkin village where parties failed to 
fulfil their basic function of representing voters and formulating some vision of the public 
interest. They became instead tools of corrupt business groups. 
 Indeed, he suggests, this process went so far that these corrupted pseudo-parties were in reality 
a new form of ‘anti-system’ party, as threatening to liberal democracy in their own way as the 
ideologically extremist parties for whom this label is usually reserved. This was particularly the 
case given the ability of informal networks to use their control of parties and politicians to 
disable or capture law enforcement and monitoring institutions, such as the police, prosecutors 
and judiciary. 
In sum, Klíma concludes Czechia ended up with a ‘clientelistic democracy’ where ‘although at 
first glance [there was] a democratically elected representative government, in reality the 
country was managed by an opaque grey zone of shady business and politics’. So fatally has 
the influence of corrupt business groups damaged the rule of law and negated democratic 
choice, he argues, that the country qualifies as what German political scientist Wolfgang Merkel 
(2004) termed a ‘defective democracy’, and more specifically, as a form of ‘illiberal 
democracy’. 
 
The most interesting question posed by Klíma, however, is whether such a hollow, captured 
and corrupt party-political mainstream is preparing the way for some form of full-blooded 
illiberalism or authoritarianism. There are some signs that it might. Few observers could have 
missed the brutal power-seeking logic of Czechia’s first directly elected president, Miloš 
Zeman, when he attempted to bend the constitution by imposing a technocrat government over 
the heads of the country’s political parties in 2013 (Hanley 2013). Zeman’s plans were thwarted 
when parties -managed to unite sufficiently to call early elections. But a surer footed or luckier 
politician than Zeman might have got away with an extended period of de facto presidential 
government. 
  
The billionaire populist (and current Finance minister) Andrej Babiš, whose ANO movement 
came from nowhere to become the country’s second biggest party in 2103, is another plausible-
looking candidate to put Czechia on the road to democratic backsliding. He has electoral 
momentum and the unparalleled concentration of political, economic and media power in Mr 
Babiš’s hands makes the labyrinthine informal networks of the ‘regional godfathers’ seem 
feeble by comparison. 
 
 
Dirty money and shady business 
 
Od totality k defektní demokraciii is a fascinating, thought-provoking and groundbreaking 
study, which would certainly merit publication in English. It is possibly the first full length 
academic work on Czech party politics to foreground the question of how informal structures 
affect formal party politics, rather than relegating it to incidental remarks. 
However, its thorough analysis of the enmeshing of formal representative institutions and 
informal socio-economic power structures sometimes begs more questions than it answers. Two 
issues in particular stand out. 
 
The first is the question of where the money corruptly raked off in bribes, kickbacks and 
inflated, rigged tenders goes. In many of the cases detailed it seems to go straight into the 
pockets of politicians and businessmen themselves, financing luxurious lifestyles, implausible 
personal fortunes and hard-to-explain property empires. Much less clear is if and how political 
parties take their cut – in other words, whether corruption feeds an electoral and political arms 
race driven by the politicians’ need to fight expensive election campaigns, or whether it is 
simply about well-placed individuals and groups exploiting democratic politics for personal 
enrichment? 
The second is the issue of who or what is pulling the strings and eating into party structures. 
The book refers throughout to the sphere of ‘nontransparent’ (netransparentní) business and 
businesspeople. However, in the end we learn little about the nature of these economic actors 
and how they fit into the wider political economy of the Czech Republic – beyond the fact that 
some have links to the criminal underworld or made earlier ‘careers’ in the late communist 
period as black market hard currency dealers (veksláci). Both these points underline that 
political- or economic sociology, rather than just political science may be needed to understand 
some of the strange transformations Czech parties have undergone. 
 
 
Clientelism vs. klientelismus 
 
The book also offers a number of innovative comparative and theoretical ideas, often adapting 
the literature on models of democracy and party organisation to map uncharted territory of 
informal power. But here the book is often less sure footed and less convincing than it might 
be. It is doubtful, for example, that developments in the Czech case really merit the elaboration 
of another new party type (‘the clientelistic party model’) in a field already overflowing with 
(often overlapping) models and typologies. 
 
The idea that corrupted, hollowed out parties can be seen as a new form of anti-system party is 
provocative, but ultimately seems an exercise in concept stretching: the problem seems more 
that hollow corrupt parties have constituted the core of a flawed and dysfunctional democratic 
system rather than a threat to it. If corrupt vested interests and ‘non-transparent business are, as 
Klíma suggests at one point, parasitical on the democratic process, then like all good parasites 
they need to be careful not to kill their host. 
  
Problematic too is that the book seemingly takes over the Czech journalistic notion 
of klientelismus as a loose umbrella term covering all manner of legal and illegal informal 
practices ranging from patronage and influence-peddling to forms of political corruption. In the 
political science literature however, ‘clientelism’ is usually understood more narrowly as 
politicians trading favours and ‘selective benefits’ with groups or individuals in exchange for 
electoral or political support, sometimes (historically) via extensive many-layered patron-client 
networks reaching down from elite level to the grassroots (Kitschelt, Wilkinson 2007). 
 
While the trading of blocs of votes in hollowed out party organisations Klíma describes 
probably would qualify as clientelistic, much of the klientelismus reported seems in fact to be 
straightforward corrupt exchanges between businessmen and politicians. Moreover, as the book 
makes clear, most Czechs who cast votes do on the basis of broad general assessments of what 
parties will do – viewed in terms of personal self-interest or some notion of the public good – 
and not in the expectation that they, their families or communities will get a direct pay-off in 
recompense in the form of jobs, spending or political favours. 
Instead, Klíma suggests, corrupt politics has changed the party – voter relationship in a different 
way: the emergence of new anti-corruption parties in successive Czech elections, he argues, 
heralds a shift away from patterns of left-right voting to one where voters assess parties on the 
basis of their (perceived) corruption, competence and cleanness. 
This is an intriguing and plausible idea, but one that perhaps runs ahead of available evidence. 
It is hard to rule out that the volatility of Czechia’s 2010 and 2013 elections might simply be 
the prelude to a remaking of the party system along familiar lines with one time hard-to-place. 
anti-establishment outsiders quickly slotting in to familiar ideological roles – as has occurred 
in Poland and Slovakia. 
 
 
 Where did it all go wrong? 
 
When and why did the Czech experiment with building ‘standard’ West European-style parties 
go wrong? Klíma offers four basic explanations: 1) the weakness and lack of autonomy of 
political institutions given the baleful legacy of communism; 2) the weakness of civil society 
and the middle class as potential checks on political power; 3) the poor quality and lack of 
‘political culture’ of the political class and 4) the tendency of the two main parties, the Civic 
Democrats (ODS) and Social Democrats (ČSSD) to collude, rather than compete, especially 
following the 1998–2002 ‘Opposition Agreement’ pact they signed to allow a minority Social 
Democrat administration to take office, which also ushered in an era of ODS-ČSSD Grand 
Coalitions at regional and city level. 
 
The first two points are textbook descriptions of post-communist politics and societies across 
Central and Eastern Europe. However, in the Czech context they pose the question of whether 
the country’s democratic traditions and the legacies of bureaucratic autonomy handed down 
from the pre-communist era really counted that much. Was there in hindsight a certain 
inevitability about the implosion of the seemingly consolidated parties of 1990s? 
Deficiency of elite ‘political culture’ is a concern frequently voiced by Czech writers. For 
outside obsververs it is a judgement that can seem pat and superficial. Anyone dipping into 
coverage of politics Australian (Wright 2015) or Irish style (Smyth 2014) will find yobbery and 
unparliamentary language galore in these long established and successful democracies, which 
make the Czech parliament look sedate. But at a deeper level the usual Czech worries over 
‘political culture’ tap into a concern – heightened by recent developments in Hungary and 
Poland – that, unpoliced and given the opportunity, many in Central and Eastern Europe’s 
political class will not only steal, but willingly sign up to a illiberal project if one comes along. 
In other words, that they are, to use the jargon, potentially ‘disloyal elites’. 
The fourth point relating to the Opposition Agreement is different in being both Czech-specific 
and putting the blame for democratic malaise less on a failure to overcome history or legacies 
of the communist past, than on the dynamics of later party competition and the bad calls made 
by politicians in 1990s. The ill-considered and cynical pact between the Civic Democrats and 
Social Democrats it is argued – although partly rooted in the difficulties of coalition building 
thrown up by the parliamentary presence of the ‘uncoalitionable’ Communist Party – shut down 
competition between the two main parties, giving the green light to corrupt mutual self-
enrichment and leading to a ‘parcelling out’ of state agencies and companies between them. 
This interpretation echoes both journalistic accounts of the period and academic research, which 
sees ‘state exploitation’ by Czech parties as stemming from a lack of ‘robust competition’ 
between them. However, it is not an uncontested view. Lubomír Kopeček’s meticulously 
researched book on the Opposition Agreement (Kopeček 2015), for example, takes issue with 
the idea that it was a cartel-like ‘hidden grand coalition’ which tipped the country into a form 
of corrupt illiberal democracy. 
Far from cementing a mutually beneficial oligopoly, he claims, after the two parties’ joint 
project to introduce a majoritarian electoral system was torpedoed by the Czech Constitutional 
Court, they were often at politically each other’s throats. Moreover, Kopeček questions what 
he terms the ‘corruption myth’ which makes Opposition Agreement out to be the font of 
subsequent corrupt politics. While allowing that the Agreement saw a certain ‘economisation 
of politics’ (including the rise of ‘regional ‘godfathers’), in his view the pact merely exacerbated 
already well established trends. 
Opportunities for corruption were opened up, Kopeček suggests, not by inter-party collusion 
by ‘captured’ parties by the changes wrought by EU-mandated regionalisation (which took 
effect in 2000–2002) and the coming of EU structural funds (which would have occurred under 
any government). In this interpretation, it is the collison between party politics and 
Europeanisation, as well as parties’ inability to manage a shifting economic landscape, that left 
them vulnerable to corruption. 
 
 
 What is to be done? 
 
In the final chapter Klíma sketches a broad agenda for reform designed to renew Czech 
democracy and rescue the unloved but necessary institution of the political party, reforms that 
might be introduced through a Czech ‘Constitutional Convention’. 
  
Formal institutions of state including the civil service, the judiciary and the police, he suggests, 
need to be strengthened and made more independent by introducing longer terms for those 
heading public bodies and executive agencies and reducing the control elected politicians can 
exercise over them. References to an allegedly oversized Czech public sector and a nod towards 
Fareed Zakaria’s argument that liberal constitutionalism should take precedence over 
democratic majorities where the two are in conflict hints that politicians’ power might be cut 
back through some form of radical marketisation of public service delivery. 
What is less clear, however, is how such reforms could be delivered in practice politically and 
why efforts at the re-regulation of parties and political power might not misfire in the same way 
as earlier reforms. One answer may be that they could occur as a ‘Big Bang’ package – a 
concept influential in anti-corruption policy studies (Rothstein 2011). Klíma himself draws a 
parallel with emergency reforms of banking systems in some countries at the height of the 
2008–2009 Recession. 
 
A Constitutional Convention in any literal sense would require a degree of inter-party consensus 
(or degree of social and political crisis) that seems unlikely to occur. However, Klíma’s appeal 
for a Czech Madisonian moment might best be taken more metaphorically as a call for concerted 
and co-ordinated reform. In either scenario, however, it is a little unclear what political or social 
forces might deliver the deep and far-reaching change envisaged. 
The burgeoning anticorruption parties that emerged in both 2010 and 2013 have, as Klíma ably 
shows, either been extremist or themselves the creatures of business interests. In an echo of 
Václav Havel, the book also suggests that civil society needs to be re-energised so it can hold 
parties and politicians to account and that the impetus for anticorruption comes from the 
frustrated Czech middle classes. – However, it is hard to see quite what form such civic control 
might take. although the angry mass protests in Slovakia and Bulgaria in 2012 and 2013–2014 
are mentioned, as is the Ukrainian Maidan Revolution. 
Some of the proposed political reforms also seem shot through with potential unintended 
consequences. Any effort to roll back the frontiers of political corruption through market reform 
of the public sector, for example, would need to face up to the fact that poorly regulated free 
markets lie at the origin of many of the Czech Republic’s current problems. 
And, as the experience of nearby Hungary shows, in the wrong hands entrenching top officials 
with long terms of office can be a tool for building a corrupt, partisan illiberal democracy, rather 
than enhancing the independence of state institutions. 
Moreover, even if genuinely neutral technocratic experts and institutions can be put in place, 
this may raise additional questions about democratic governance and party government. As 
Peter Mair famously noted, increasing resort to expert decision-making and non-majoritarian 
institutions in Western European democracies has tended to further hollow out political parties 
rather than revitalising them (Mair 2013). 
In some ways in the already hollow Czech context this might not matter. In the book’s 
conclusion Klíma argues (realistically in my view) that the era of large membership-based 
parties, even on the modest scale that Czech politicians conceived of in 1990s, has passed. 
Expressing scepticism about quick-fix reforms such as changes to the electoral system, Klíma 
suggests, that although parties will be a central part of the future Czech democratic architecture 
– they are, after all, mentioned in the Constitution –they will, like it or not, be organisationally 
small, elite creations far removed from the socially rooted, internally democratic membership 
organisations envisaged in Czech party law. 
Proposed reforms to make parties more centralised and introduce waiting times and screening 
for new members – measures some Czech parties have already taken up – seem to these 
recognise realities and to push parties further in this direction, as do the suggestions that parties 
should be more open at elite level to allow the recruitment of wider range of candidates from 
non-political backgrounds (a practice already tried – or supposedly tried – by a range of Czech 
political groupings over the years). 
 
 
Reasons to be cheerful? 
 
Although ending on a call to arms, the underlying tone of Od totality k defektní demokracii is 
one of pessimism. This is perhaps to be expected in a book which for the first time 
systematically probes the seamier, informal side of Czech party politics. 
But to an extent its diagnosis and its pessimism may be overstated – or rather misdated. Much 
of its analysis describes a party system which has now disintegrated, having largely melted 
down in the ‘earthquake elections’ of 2010 and 2013. Czech voters themselves came to similar 
conclusions to those presented in the book about the corruption and clientelism of established 
parties. They then had little compunction – and little difficulty – in ‘throwing the rascals out’ 
and turning to the new parties. The groundswell of public and media demand for more effective 
investigation of corruption cases also seems to have led the Civic Democrat-led coalition of 
2010–2013 to free the hands of police and prosecutors, paving the way for their destruction 
amid police raids and scandal. 
‘Clientelistic democracy’ is, moreover, not a contradiction in terms. Clientelism has historically 
often proven a rather effective way of organising parties and linking parties to voters, easily co-
existing with elements of ‘normal’ ideological or class-based competition. 
Even in the Czech context there is the uncomfortable, but quite conceivable possibility – 
characteristically voiced by Václav Klaus – that klientelismus might have been functional, even 
necessary, for Czech party democracy, co-ordinating and bringing predictability and stability 
to mass of shell-like district organisations which made up the country’s two biggest parties. 
While eating away at Czech party democracy in the long-term, the ‘regional godfathers’ may 
have propped it up in the short term. 
Overall, this suggests that Czechia’s democracy is more flawed than ‘defective’ (in Wolfgang 
Merkel’s sense of the term) – with its biggest and most underlying flaw being the weakness of 
civil society as a mechanism of horizontal accountability – rather than the total subversion of 
democratic competition or the collapse of the rule of law. 
This is, of course, not to say that everything in the garden is rosy. If corrupt vested interests 
have privileged, covert access to political decision-makers and democratic choice appears a 
facade, representation and – correspondingly – the legitimacy of the democratic system can 
only be damaged in the eyes of citizens. 
Public goods from hospitals to motorways to armoured personnel carriers will also be more 
expensive and of poorer quality; and citizens will find themselves paying higher taxes if corrupt 
insiders can skew public policy outcomes to their own advantage. Corruption is not a good 
thing. 
But, the damage done so far is more to policy-making and the quality of democracy than to the 
democratic system itself and does not signal regression into a diminished sub-type of illiberal 
democracy is under way. As recent exposés of the role of the super-rich in US politics underline, 
the power of social elites and special interests, especially big business, to suborn elected 
representatives is hardly unknown in the oldest and most advanced democracies, even if in 
Czechia the equivalent phenomena take particularly corrupt forms. 
Faced with widespread (talk of) political corruption disillusioned citizens in Central Europe 
withdraw from an already hollowed out, low-participation system or turn to variety of unstable, 
elite-dominated protest parties, often themselves vehicles for business interests posing as 
defenders of the public interest. It remains an open question whether – and in what measure – 
these changes are a bane or boon. 
 
In the Czech case much will depend on the political future of Andrej Babiš and his movement. 
These are, as Klíma astutely notes, ambiguous phenomena. Babiš is not quite the cartoon villain 
some have portrayed and his movement reflects a genuine demand for good governance 
(Hanley 2015). In government it has pushed reforms in the direction of strengthening the 
independence of state institutions and greater transparency. 
  
On the other hand, it presents us with the spectacle of a top-down, privately owned party, whose 
grassroots seems to consist of lovingly maintained astroturf and whose billionaire leader-
proprietor personifies the fusion of economic, media and political power. 
Periodically dismantling corruptly captured political machines and reining in the influence of 
big money in politics might thus be as part of the ebb and flow of democratic development, 
rather than the first slip in a long slide into illiberalism or authoritarianism. But, especially in 
post-communist Central Europe, even where there is ‘only’ corruption, rather than the illiberal 
ruling parties seen in Hungary or Poland, there is nothing to guarantee that such a slide cannot 
take. 
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